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-.01cm-.01cm The eﬀect of advertising on market performance has been a
long-standing debate. Advertising that increases the dispersion of consumers’
valuations for advertised goods raises the market power of ﬁrms, while adver-
tising that decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations leads to narrower
price-cost margins and superior performance in markets for advertised goods.
Numerous challenges confound the empirical identiﬁcation of advertising ef-
fects on market performance. This paper proposes a simple method that relies
on the revealed preferences of ﬁrms participating in generic advertising pro-
grams. Generic advertising programs provide a unique window through which
to observe advertising eﬀects on market performance, because changes in the
dispersion of consumers’ valuations systematically redistributes rents among
ﬁrms according to observable characteristics on producer size. We examine
producer attitudes towards generic advertising in the “Beef. It’s What’s for
Dinner” campaign of the U.S. Beef Checkoﬀ program and ﬁnd the likelihood
a producer favors an expansion of the advertising program increases in oper-
ating scale. This ﬁnding is consistent with advertising eﬀects that have led to
a decrease in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations for beef products and a
commensurate increase in market performance.
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A long-standing debate in the economics of advertising is the eﬀect of advertising
on market performance.1 One school of thought, articulated in the contributions of
Kaldor (1950) and Bain (1956), advocates that advertising serves primarily a persua-
sive role. According to this view, advertising increases product diﬀerentiation and
deters entry by contributing recognition and prestige to advertised goods, thereby in-
ﬂating the market power of ﬁrms selling advertised goods and bracing prices. A second
school of thought, formalized by Ozga (1960), Stigler (1961), Telser (1964) and Nelson
(1970, 1974), points to the important role of advertising in providing price and prod-
uct quality information. Informative advertising reduces the costs associated with
consumer search and facilitates substitution possibilities between products, resulting
in lower prices and superior market performance.
In this Journal, Becker and Murphy (1993) present a theory of advertising as
a complementary product to advertised goods. This “complementary view” is suﬃ-
ciently general to allow advertising to provide private consumption values (e.g., adver-
tisements in the Yellow Pages), public good values (e.g., “social status” emerging in
equilibrium through an element of collective persuasion), or joint consumption value
with media goods (e.g., advertising bundled and “sold” together with television pro-
gramming).2 T h es e n s i b l ec o n c l u s i o ne m e r g i n gf rom this view is that understanding
the welfare eﬀects of advertising requires looking at advertising markets in addition to
the markets for advertised goods. Nevertheless, it is clear that encompassing a com-
plementary advertising “good” in individual utility functions does little to resolve
how advertising alters the market performance of advertised goods.
We propose a novel revealed preference approach to assess how advertising alters
the performance of markets for advertised goods. We frame our analysis around a
homogeneous product oligopoly market with asymmetric factor endowments among
1For an excellent review, see Bagwell (2005).
2This view represents a fundamental departure from Kaldor (1950), who regarded advertising as
a non-priced commodity sold jointly with advertised goods.
1ﬁrms, and propel our study by formulating a few simple observations on how changes
in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations for an advertised good redistribute rents
among producers in the market. Speciﬁcally, we consider generic advertising programs
funded through per-unit levies on output and show that advertising messages that
increase (decrease) the dispersion of consumers’ valuations allocate a disproportionate
share of advertising rents to producers with smaller (larger) factor endowments.
Generic advertising programs funded through so-called “checkoﬀ fees” are com-
monly employed for commodity promotion in the United States under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. These cooperative arrangements provide a useful
lens to examine the eﬀect of advertising on market performance since they allow us to
make inferences on advertising-induced changes in the dispersion of consumers’ valu-
ations in the market by observing the revealed preferences of producers participating
in the programs. Although this approach is clearly limited in scope to examining
collectively-funded advertising programs, it has the advantage of being based on the
preferences of actual market participants.
There are well-known empirical challenges to measuring the degree of complemen-
tarity between goods in individual utility functions containing an arbitrary collection
of goods. Take for example Samuelson’s (1974) discussion of coﬀee, tea, and cream.
Coﬀee and tea are substitutes, and both coﬀee and tea are complementary to cream.
If cream is “more complementary” to tea than to coﬀee —in the sense that consumers
use more cream in a cup of tea than they use in a cup of coﬀee— then a rise in the
price of coﬀee that causes consumers to drink less coﬀee and more tea can lead to
a rise in cream sales. In the case of complementarity between advertising and ad-
vertised goods, moreover, the link between advertising and market performance is
further complicated by the need to address the higher-order eﬀect of advertising on
the dispersion of consumers’ valuations.
Our approach overcomes some of the objections to earlier studies of the impact
of advertising on the market performance of advertised goods. Following Bain (1956)
and Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974), a large literature has developed that seeks
2to empirically identify the linkage between advertising and market performance in
market data; however, measurement and endogeneity issues confound the interpre-
tation of these results. Changes in demand over time can be driven by a number
of factors unrelated to the advertising expenditure of a given ﬁrm or industry. Cur-
rent advertising and sales levels can also aﬀect future demand, as would be the case
when “social status” is durable or when temporal consumption levels lead to habit
formation, and this requires specifying a distributed lag structure (Clarke 1976; Er-
dem and Keane 1996; Ackerberg 2001). Moreover, advertising ﬁrms may be attracted
to industries with inelastic demand conditions, and multi-product retailers may use
advertised brands as loss-leaders to facilitate the sales of related retail goods. Such
empirical complications may explain the conﬂicting ﬁndings of studies that estimate
the eﬀect of advertising on the price elasticity of demand.3
Experimental evidence on the eﬀect of advertising on market performance is also
mixed. Natural experiments, for instance Benham’s (1972) well-known study on ad-
vertising bans in the eyeglass market and the related studies by Cady (1976) and
Kwoka (1984), generally ﬁnd prices to be lower in regions allowing advertising rel-
ative to regions that impose advertising bans.4 In contrast, the general outcome of
laboratory and ﬁeld experiments, for instance the interesting “split cable” TV ﬁeld ex-
periment by Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985), is that adverting decreases the elasticity
of demand (Kaul and Wittink 1995).5
Our observations are closely related to those of Johnson and Myatt (2006), who
show that informative advertising resultsi nac l o c k w i s er o t a t i o no fd e m a n dw h e n
information increases the dispersion of consumer valuations. Consumer valuations
can become more disperse when advertisements provide information on attributes
3For a recent review see Erdem, Keane and Sun (2008).
4An objection to these studies is that they do not achieve randomization when advertising bans
in political jurisdictions are not exogenous to prices. A recent study by Milyo and Waldfogel (1999)
remedies this problem by using longitudinal data on liquor products in Rhode Island and Mas-
sachusetts that extends over the period in which the Supreme Court overturned Rhode Island’s ban
on liquor price advertising; however, they ﬁnd the lifting of the advertising ban to have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on prices.
5For the case of laboratory experiments, recent evidence suggests that lab respondents may
express systematically higher willingness to pay values than actual market participants (List 2006).
3for which consumers have subjective tastes.6 Johnson and Myatt (2006) classify
advertising that leads to outward shifts in market demand as “hype” and refer to
advertising that leads to clockwise rotations of market demand as providing “real
information”. Although we believe the rigid classiﬁcation of advertising as “hype”
and “real information” to be overly restrictive, it is clear that the decomposition be-
tween level eﬀects and rotation eﬀects provides a reasonable taxonomy for examining
advertising-induced changes in market demand.
W es e en or e a s o nw h yp e r s u a s i v ea d v e r t i s i n g( “ h y p e ” )c a n n o ta l s oi n ﬂuence the
dispersion of consumers’ valuations.7 Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2008)
have recently formalized a psychological role for persuasive advertising to inﬂuence
the behavior of “coarse thinkers” through product associations, for instance the as-
sociation made between hair and silk in Shampoo advertisements. Such advertising
would increase the dispersion of consumers’ valuations if coarse thinkers tend to pop-
ulate the extremes of the value distribution. But it is also conceptually possible for
advertising to decrease the dispersion of consumers’ valuations. Indeed, as Becker
and Murphy (1993, p. 955) observe, ﬁrms may “try to tailor their advertising to
bring up the demands of marginal consumers since these drag down the equilibrium
price paid by inframarginal consumers.”
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In the following section, we
brieﬂy describe the generic advertising program that frames our study: the “Beef.
It’s what’s for dinner!” campaign. This is an ideal market to study for three reasons:
(i) participation in the generic advertising program is mandatory for all beef sold
in the U.S., (ii) there is considerable variation in the operating scale of individual
beef producers, and (iii) the U.S. Department of Agriculture recently completed a
comprehensive survey of producer preferences for the generic advertising program
that categorizes respondents based on producer size. In Section III, we formulate a
6Schmalensee (1978) and Ackerberg (2001) also point out that informative advertising may make
some consumers less inclined to buy the product.
7It is worthwhile to note that a change in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations has consequences
only at the upper tail of the value distribution since consumers at the lower tail do not purchase the
product.
4model that links changes in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations to changes in the
distribution of rents among individual producers in a generic advertising program.
In Section IV, we derive implications of the model for producer preferences towards
expanding generic advertising in the Beef Chaeckoﬀ program. Section V describes
our empirical approach and presents our estimation results.
2 Generic Advertising for U.S. Beef
We examine the preferences of members of the Beef Checkoﬀ Program who fund the
“Beef. It’s what’s for dinner!” advertising campaign. This section brieﬂy describes
the institutional details and history of this generic advertising program.
Virtually every agricultural commodity sold in the U.S. relies on mandatory fees
among members for generic promotion. The earliest forms of generic advertising
programs were funded through voluntary contributions among members and suﬀered
from common property problems. To resolve these problems, pressure among industry
groups led to the passage of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and
the subsequent formation of State and Federally-mandated checkoﬀ programs.
The Beef Checkoﬀ Program was formalized by the Beef Promotion and Research
Act of 1985. Under the Beef Promotion and Research Act, a $1 per head checkoﬀ
fee is levied on all sales or importation of cattle in the U.S. This assessment is used
to fund promotional activities for beef by a Federally-appointed Cattleman’s Beef
Research and Promotion Board.8
Since the 1985 decision, various beef producers have constitutionally challenged
the Beef Checkoﬀ Program on the basis that generic advertising violates an individ-
ual’s right to free speech. For instance, a mandatory assessment might force beef
producers to pay for an advertising message they do not support. In 2001, the U.S.
trial court ruled the Beef Checkoﬀ Program to be unconstitutional. This decision was
appealed and subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court in 2005, where it was
8See, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.) and the Beef
Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.).
5decided that advertising by the Beef Checkoﬀ Program did not violate the constitu-
tional rights of members on the ground that generic advertising serves as a form of
government speech.9
It is often argued that generic advertising programs harm producers who seek to
develop niche market positions. For example, generic advertising by the National
Pork Board, which promotes pork as “the other white meat,” was recently contested
by niche market producers who were seeking to emphasize quality attributes such as
tenderness, pH, and water-holding capacity that are more prevalent in darker meats
with higher intramuscular fat (Honeyman et al., 2006). We believe the implication
goes the other way. In principle, there is no reason why advertising messages cannot
increase the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, for instance generic beef advertising
might raise the valuations of consumers of Kobe-style beef on the high willingness-to-
pay segment of the market to a greater extent than advertising raises the valuations
of consumers on the low willingness-to-pay segment of the market. Such advertising
would lead to relatively favorable outcomes for producers who adopt niche market
positions at the expense of producers adopting mass market positions. Our view
is that the observation of systematic characteristics among producers who oppose
generic advertising programs reveals the role of advertising in changing the dispersion
of consumers’ valuations.
3 The Model
Our model is framed around generic advertising in a homogeneous product oligopoly
market. The advertising level is administered by a marketing board that levies a
per-unit checkoﬀ f e eo nt h eo u t p u to fm e m b e r si nt h ep r o g r a m .M e m b e r s h i pi nt h e
program is mandatory and the marketing board uses all checkoﬀ fee revenues to
acquire generic advertising messages through forward contracts with a competitive
advertising industry. For analytic convenience, we consider advertising contracts that
9See Livestock Marketing Assoc. (LMA) v. USDA (132 F. Supp. 2d 817 (D. S.D. 2001), and
Johanns, et al. v. LMA (544 U.S. 550 2005).
6fully dissipate checkoﬀ fee revenues in the market under complete information.10
Advertising expenditure is given by A = τQ,w h e r eτ is the checkoﬀ fee and
Q is the market output level. Inverse demand in the market is P(Q,τ), which is
downward-sloping in industry output, PQ(Q,τ) < 0 and concave in the checkoﬀ rate;
Pτ(Q,τ) > 0, Pττ(Q,τ) < 0. We classify the rotation eﬀect of advertising on demand
as follows: (i) PQτ(Q,τ) = 0 for a parallel shift; (ii) PQτ(Q,τ) < 0f o rac l o c k w i s e
rotation; and (iii) PQτ(Q,τ) > 0 for a counterclockwise rotation. The eﬀect of
advertising on market demand can then be decomposed into an outward shift and
rotatation component, where advertising can increase the dispersion of consumers’
valuations (leading to a counterclockwise rotation at the equilibrium output level) or
decrease the dispersion of consumers’ valuations (leading to a clockwise rotation).
The demand rotation eﬀects in our model correspond to changes in the advertising-
output ratio, τ = A/Q.T h i s d i ﬀers from the approach of Telser (1964) and the
literature that follows that examines how changes in the advertising-sales ratio aﬀect
market performance. Under circumstances in which a generic advertising program
collects fees on an ad valorem basis at rate α on sales, A = αpQ,r o t a t i o ne ﬀects on
demand that arise from changes in α correspond to examining the eﬀect of changes
in the advertising-sales ratio on market performance.
The solution concept for the market equilibrium is Nash in quantities. We take
the number of ﬁrms (n) to be exogenous, which reﬂects the presence of a ﬁxed factor
of production, for instance ownership of scarce land assets, of which the ﬁrms have
asymmetric endowments. Proﬁts persist in the form of rents returned to the ﬁxed
factor, and the outcome can approximate competitive market conditions in the usuual
case where the number of operating ﬁrms is large. We refer to the ﬁxed factor as
“capital” and denote the capital endowment of ﬁrm i.by ki,i =1 ,...,n.
10Some marketing boards allocate a share of revenues from checkoﬀ fees to research and develop-
ment activities; however, the vast majority of checkoﬀ revenues in agricultural markets is spent on
generic advertising and promotion activities (Williams and Capps, 2006).
73.1 Market Outcome
The total cost to ﬁrm i of producing the output level qi is given by ci(qi,k i). We follow
Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) in assuming the production
cost of ﬁrm i to be increasing in output, ci
q ≡ ∂ci(qi,k i)/∂qi > 0, and marginal
production cost to be decreasing in the ﬁrm’s endowment, ci
qk ≡ ∂2ci(qi,k i)/∂qi∂ki <
0.
Firm i takes the checkoﬀ rate τ as parametric and selects the output level, qi,t o
maximize proﬁts, πi(qi,k i,Q,τ) ≡ p(Q,τ)qi − ci(qi,k i) − τqi, given the output levels
selected by his rivals. The ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i is
π
i
i ≡ p(Q,τ)+qipQ(Q,τ) − c
i
q(qi,k i) − τ =0 ,i =1 ,...,n. (1)
Letting ˜ k ≡ (k1,...,kn) denote the industry-wide vector of capital stocks, the Nash
equilibrium is a vector of quantities, ˜ q∗(τ,˜ k)=( q∗
1(τ,˜ k),...,q∗
n(τ,˜ k)) that satisﬁes
equation (1) for each of the n ﬁrms.11
We employ the standard existence and stability conditions (see Vives 1999, pp
96-97),
θi ≡ pQ(Q,τ)+qipQQ(Q,τ) < 0,i =1 ,...,n, (2)
¯ ωi ≡ c
i
qq(qi,k i)+pQ(Q,τ) > 0,i =1 ,...,n. (3)
In addition, we denote (without restriction) the eﬀect of a change in the checkoﬀ fee
on the marginal revenue of ﬁrm i by
γi ≡ pτ(Q,τ)+qiPQτ(Q,τ) − 1,i =1 ,...,n. (4)
Notice that advertising messages that involve only level eﬀects on market demand,
pQτ(Q,τ) = 0, do not lead to ﬁrm-speciﬁc changes in marginal revenue. Level ef-
fects on market demand uniformly raise marginal revenue for all ﬁrms. In contrast,
advertising messages that create both level eﬀects and rotation eﬀects on market
11Notice that it follows from this condition that the equilibrium level of output is larger for ﬁrms
with relatively highly levels of capitalization; that is, q∗
i >q ∗
j if and only if ki >k j.
8demand raise marginal revenue by more for ﬁrms with large output levels than for
those with smaller output levels when pQτ(Q,τ) > 0, and lower marginal revenue
disproportionately for ﬁrms with large output level when pQτ(Q,τ) < 0.
Making use of conditions (1)-(4), the eﬀect of an increase in the checkoﬀ rate
on individual and aggregate output levels can be examined by totally diﬀerentiating
equation (1). Doing so yields
θidQ − ¯ ωidqi + γidτ =0 .
Rearranging this equation, the change in output for ﬁrm i is given by
dqi = −λidQ + δidτ. (5)
where λi = −(θi/¯ ωi)a n dδi = γi/¯ ωi.
The distribution of λi’s and δi’s in the industry are critical. λi measures ﬁrm i’s
equilibrium output responsiveness to changes in the market price that occur through
movements along the demand curve and is related to the slope of ﬁrm i’s reaction
function. Namely, λi ≡ Ri/(1 − Ri), where Ri ∈ (0,1) denotes the slope of ﬁrm i’s
reaction function (in absolute terms). Similarly, δi measures the sensitivity of ﬁrm i’s
equilibrium output response to changes in the checkoﬀ rate.
The change in total output following an arbitrarily small change in the level of









i λi and δ =
P
i δi.N o t i n gt h a tλi > 0 for all i under our assumptions,
λ > 0, and it follows that a marginal increase in the checkoﬀ rate increases the market
output level only if δ > 0, where the sign of δi is given by equation (4). The intuition is
that the demand facing producers net of the checkoﬀ fee is unaltered by the program
when a marginal increase in the checkoﬀ rate of dτ units leads to a parallel shift
in market demand of pτ(Q,τ)dτ = dτ units since the unit checkoﬀ fee is entirely
passed through to consumers. For a change in the checkoﬀ rate that satisﬁes dτ =
9pτ(Q,τ)dτ, generic advertising that increases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations,
pQτ(Q,τ)dτ < 0, results in a decrease in the equilibrium output level, whereas generic
advertising that decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ(Q,τ)dτ > 0,
results in an increase in the equilibrium output level in the industry.
3.2 Industry Optimal Advertising
The objective of the marketing board is to maximize industry proﬁts through the
selection of a unit checkoﬀ fee. Given the equilibrium output level in equation (1),









i(qi(τ,˜ k),k i) − τQ(τ,˜ k).
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition is




i(dqi/dτ)+pτQ − Q =0 , (7)
where arguments are suppressed for notational convenience. Substituting dQ/dτ =
X
i
dqi/dτ into equation (7), making use of equation (1), and converting the resulting













where si = qi/Q is the market share of ﬁrm i.L e t τ∗ denote the industry optimal
advertising level that solves equation (8).
The intuition for equation (8) is straightforward. The ﬁrst two terms on the left-
hand side are the direct eﬀects of a marginal advertising unit on industry proﬁt. A
marginal increase in generic advertising of dτ units has a direct eﬀect on the net
price received by producers of (pτ − 1)dτ units. The remaining term in (8), which
can be written pQ(
P
i(1−si)∂qi/∂τ), adjusts the advertising level to account for the
oligopoly externality in the market, as externalities between members is something
the marketing board can resolve.
10It is generally the case that industry output decreases on the margin in response to
an increase in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ < 0, and increases following
a decrease in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ > 0. For instance, consider
the symmetric outcome under a standard regularity condition on the elasticity of the





Condition (9) rules out cases in which an increase in marginal cost raises industry
proﬁts and implies that ψ ≡ cqq−2pQ−QpQQ > 0 for the representative ﬁrm. Making
use of this in equation (6) and imposing symmetry, the change in industry output




n(pτ − 1) + QpQτ
ψ
. (10)











Noting that the right-hand side of equation (11) is positive, it follows that pτ − 1
s =
pQτ,w h e r e“
s =” denotes “equals in sign”. By inspection of equation (10), industry
output decreases on the margin in response to dτ > 0 when advertising increases the
dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ < 0, and increases when advertising reduces
the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ > 0.
When a marginal unit of generic advertising involves only a level eﬀect on demand,
pQτ =0 ,a n ds a t i s ﬁes pτdτ = dτ, the increase in advertising leads to no change in
the demand conditions facing producers, and hence has no eﬀect on ﬁrm or industry
proﬁtability on the margin. A symmetric industry would cease advertising at this
point (since pττ < 0). If advertising combines a level eﬀect on market demand with
an increase in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, pQτ < 0, then industry output
decreases in equilibrium, widening price-cost margins for ﬁrms selling the advertised
good and commensurately raising the return to advertising on the margin. Further
advertising is optimal, so that pτ − 1 < 0 at the industry optimum. Conversely,
11pτ −1 > 0 at the industry optimum when generic advertising decreases the dispersion
of consumers’ valuations in the market, pQτ > 0.
When ﬁrms in an industry have diﬀerent factor endowments, the advertising level
that maximizes industry rents also accounts for changes in allocative eﬃciency. If
advertising redistributes industry output towards ﬁrms with “small” capital endow-
ments and away from highly-capitalized ﬁrms, this raises industry costs by increasing
the market shares of less-eﬃcient ﬁrms.12
3.3 Individually Optimal Advertising
The optimal adverting level for ﬁrm i solves
Maxτπ
i(τ,˜ k) ≡ p(Q(τ,˜ k),τ)qi(τ,˜ k) − c
i(qi(τ,˜ k),k i) − τqi(τ,˜ k),
which is characterized by the rate of change:
dπi
dτ








+ pτqi − qi.
Substituting terms from equation (1) gives
dπi
dτ




Each term on the right-hand side of equation (12) has a straightforward interpretation.
The ﬁrst term is the direct eﬀect of advertising on the marginal proﬁto fﬁrm i.A
change in the check-oﬀ rate of dτ u n i t sr a i s e sr e v e n u eb ypτqidτ units and cost by
qidτ units. The second term is the indirect eﬀect of advertising on the proﬁto fﬁrm
i.H o l d i n gﬁrm i’s output constant, the proﬁto fﬁrm i is inﬂuenced indirectly by the
change in the market price resulting from the change in output of its rivals, Q − qi,
in response to an increase in generic advertising.
Inspection of equations (8) and (12) reveals the diﬀerence in industry-optimal and
privately-optimal advertising levels. The industry-optimal level of advertising rises in
12Such would be the case if advertising decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations and ﬁrms
with greater levels of capitalization have steeper marginal cost functions (i.e., ci
qq(.,ki) >c j
qq(.,kj)
for ki >k j).
12the share-weighted sum of individual output changes, whereas the privately-optimal
advertising level rises in the ﬁrm’s own output change. Formally, evaluating terms in
equation (12) at τ∗ gives
dπi
dτ



















Notice that the term in the square brackets goes to zero in the symmetric case,
si =1 /n.T h a t i s , a l l ﬁrms desire the industry optimal advertising level in the
symmetric case. When the factor endowments of ﬁrms diﬀer, rents are redistributed
in the industry between ﬁrms according to the diﬀerence between the change in “own
output” and the share-weighted change in industry output.
By inspection of (13), ﬁrm i desires a higher level of advertising than τ∗ only if
generic advertising expenditures raise the output level of ﬁrm i on the margin by
more than the increase in the share-weighted output of his rivals. Highly capitalized
ﬁrms desire more (less) advertising relative to ﬁrms with smaller capital endowments
when generic advertising raises the output level of each ﬁrm, which occurs following
a decrease (increase) in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations.
4 Advertising Outcomes and Firm Scale
In this section we follow Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and
consider a specialization of the model with linear demand (pQQ = 0) and quadratic
costs.13 Speciﬁcally, suppose inverse demand is p(Q,τ)=α(τ)−β(τ)Q and variable
cost for ﬁrm i is given by c(qi,k i)=0 .5q2
i/ki.14 In this case, ci




i , so that highly capitalized ﬁrms have ﬂatter marginal cost functions (and hence
ﬂatter reaction functions) than ﬁrms with smaller capital endowments. Advertising
messages that produce level eﬀects on market demand aﬀect α(τ), whereas changes
in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations are captured by rotation eﬀects in β(τ).
13Qualitatively similar conclusions emerge in a model with general demand conditions and linear
costs.
14This cost function, which is homogeneous of degree one, is the dual to a Cobb-Douglas production
function with q =
√
LK
13First-order condition (1) satisﬁes α(τ)−β(τ)Q−β(τ)qi−(qi/ki)=τ. This condi-
tion can be written as qi(τ)=κi(τ)(p(τ)−τ), where κi(τ) ≡ ki(1+β(τ)ki)−1 denotes
ﬁrm i’s “adjusted” capital stock. Notice that each ﬁrm’s output level is proportional
to its adjusted capital stock and that changes in the slope of inverse demand alter
the adjusted capital stock of each ﬁrm. Letting κ(τ)=
P
i κi(τ) denote the aggregate




for i =1 ,...n,a n dQ∗(τ)=
(α(τ)−τ)κ(τ)
1+β(τ)κ(τ) .
Notice that the market share of each ﬁrm is given by its share of the industry
adjusted capital stock, s∗
i ≡ q∗
i/Q∗ = κi(τ)/κ(τ); hence, advertising inﬂuences market
share only through changes in the slope of market demand since such changes alter
the adjusted capital stocks of individual ﬁrms. Diﬀerentiating these expressions,
























∗(τ) − 1]. (15)
Because the market share of each ﬁrm is determined by its share of the industry
adjusted capital stock, a change in the level of advertising induces a proportional
output adjustment for each ﬁrm. Individual output levels rise for all ﬁrms in response
to a marginal increase in the checkoﬀ rate if β
0(τ)Q∗ < α0(τ) − 1, and otherwise fall.
The industry optimal solution is characterized by substituting (14) and (15) into
(7) and making the substitution κi = siκ,w h i c hy i e l d s
(α0(τ) − β







2 is the Herﬁndahl index of industry concentration. Rear-
ranging this equation, the industry optimal level of advertising solves
β(τ)κ(τ)Q(τ)β
0(τ)(1 − H(τ)) = (1 − α
0(τ))(1 + β(τ)κ(τ)H(τ)).
14This equation implicitly deﬁnes τ∗. Notice in the case where generic advertising
results in a parallel shift in demand (β
0(τ) = 0) that the industry optimum involves
purchasing advertising messages until the outward shift in demand from the last unit
of advertising equates with the level of the per unit check-oﬀ fee (α0(τ)=1 ) .
Under circumstances in which generic advertising increases the dispersion of con-
sumers’ valuations, β
0(τ) > 0, the market power of ﬁrms in the industry rises, increas-
ing the rents to advertising. Accordingly, advertising shifts market demand on the
margin by less than the unit check oﬀ rate, α0(τ) < 1. Advertising reduces aggregate
output in this case and serves to increase the price cost margins of ﬁrms. Conversely,
when advertising decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, β
0(τ) < 0, price-
cost margins fall on the margin in response to advertising, reducing advertising rents.
In this case, advertising shifts market demand on the margin by more than the unit
check oﬀ rate, α0(τ) > 1.
To assess the advertising preferences of individual ﬁrms, substitute (14) and (15)
into equation (13) and make the substitution κi = siκ to get
dπi
dτ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
τ=τ∗




Firm i desires the socially optimal advertising level only when one of two conditions
is met: (i) ﬁrm i has market share given by si = H,o r( ii) advertising produces
a parallel shift in demand on the margin (recall that dQ/dτ =0a tτ∗ only in the
case of a parallel shift). If advertising increases the dispersion of consumers’ valua-
tions, β
0(τ) > 0, then dQ/dτ < 0a tτ∗,a n d“ s m a l l ”ﬁrms with market shares that
satisfy si <Hprefer a greater level of advertising than the industry optimal level,
whereas, if advertising decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, β
0(τ) < 0,
then dQ/dτ > 0a tτ∗,a n d“ s l a r g e ”ﬁrms with market shares that satisfy si >H
prefer a greater level of advertising than the industry optimal level.
When ﬁrms diﬀer in capital endowments, increases in market output are generally
distributed according to market share. Highly capitalized ﬁrms, which have higher
price-cost margins in equilibrium than less capitalized ﬁrms, consequently earn a
disproportionate share of industry rents from policies that lead to an expansion of
15industry output. For this reason, advertising messages that decrease the dispersion
of consumers’ valuations favor low-cost ﬁrms since this increases the price elasticity
of demand at the equilibrium point.
5 Empirical model and discussion
We draw on data from a survey conducted for the U.S. Department of Agriculture by
the Gallop Organization on the attitudes of beef producers towards the Beef Checkoﬀ
Program (USDA 2006). These data represent the most comprehensive information
available on producer attitudes towards generic advertising and include categorical
variables on the size of producers.15
Our model predicts that small (large) producers receive a disproportionately large
share of advertising rents when advertising increases (decreases) the dispersion of con-
sumers’ valuations in the beef market. This observation allows us to make inferences
on the eﬀect of advertising on market performance by examining the revealed pref-
erences of producers of diﬀerent sizes for a policy that seeks to expand the checkoﬀ-
funded generic advertising program.
The USDA-Gallop survey elicits responses for three questions on producer pref-
erences for the generic advertising. Two questions ask producers to reveal their
“blanket-level” support for the Beef Checkoﬀ Program. These questions categorize
responses regarding producers’ overall level of approval for the program (on a range
between “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve”), and record whether producers
would vote to continue the program in a referendum. The response pattern to these
questions appeared similar. For example, 77 percent of the sample either “strongly
approved” or “approved” the actions of the Checkoﬀ Board, and 79 percent stated
that they would be either very likely or somewhat likely to vote to continue the
existing Beef Checkoﬀ Program.
The third question is central to our study and asks respondents whether they
15T h es a m p l ew a ss t r a t i ﬁed by state and ﬁrm size and produced 8004 collected surveys. This
sample is representative of a population believed to be around 1 million producers (USDA, 2006).
16would prefer to decrease (=1), maintain (=2) or increase (=3) the existing $1 per
head checkoﬀ fee. This question is central to our study since the responses reveal
individual preferences for changes in advertising levels on the margin. Only 6.3 per-
cent of respondents preferred a larger checkoﬀ fee to support greater levels of generic
advertising.
Table 1 describes the demographic variables in the data. The calculated means
are from the 5077 surveys in which deﬁnitive responses were provided to all relevant
questions.16 Categorical variables are recorded for age, gender, primary operation
type, and secondary operation activities. Additionally, seven size categories are pro-
vided, ranging from 1-19 head of cattle in the smallest size category to over 1,000
head in the largest size category. The USDA (2006) provides a thorough descriptive
assessment of the survey.
We derive preliminary results from a probit model using size categories to predict
preferences for expanding generic advertising levels in the Beef Checkoﬀ Program. We
drop the largest size category (SZ7) from the regression and estimate the probability
of favoring program expansion for each of the remaining size categories.
Table 2 presents the results of the probit model. Notice that producers in the four
smallest categories (SZ1-SZ4) are each statistically less likely to support an increase
in checkoﬀ-funded advertising relative to the largest producers, while producers in
the three largest categories (SZ5 SZ6 and SZ7) are not statistically diﬀerent. These
preliminary results suggest a positive correlation exists between ﬁrm size and the
propensity to favor larger levels of generic advertising.
Given the considerable heterogeneity among survey respondents (both observed
and unobserved), the relationship between ﬁrm size and the propensity to favor
greater advertising levels is confounded by a number of econometric issues. To account
for heterogeneous factors among producers and the potential correlation between un-
observed factors that jointly explain program support and preferences for expanded
advertising levels, we estimate a bivariate ordered probit model with the full set of
16Surveys with responses of “don’t know” or “refused to answer” were dropped from the analysis.
17explanatory variables listed in Table 1.
The unobserved propensities of respondents to approve the generic advertising
program and favor program expansion are represented by latent constructs y∗
j1 and
y∗





1xi,1 + εi,1,y i,1 = j if µj−1,1 <y
∗





2xi,2 + εi,2,y i,2 = k if µk−1,2 <y
∗
i,2 <µ k,2, (17)
where β1 and β2 are the coeﬃcient vectors, xi,1 and xi,2 are the exogenous regres-
sors, εi,1 ∼ N[0,1] and εi,2 ∼ N[0,1] are the errors terms, which are assumed to
be distributed bivariate standard normal with correlation parameter ρ.T h eµ’s are
cutoﬀ values that frame the observed ordered responses. The explanatory variable
of interest is the size of grower i’s operation, which we measure as the median num-
ber of cattle sold in each size category. The remaining variables in xi,1 and xi,2 are
producer-speciﬁc attributes that may inﬂuence preferences for the generic advertising
program.
We refer to equation (16) as the “approval” model and to equation (17) as the
“WTP” model. Our primary interest is whether producer size explains the probability
that a producer is willing to pay a higher checkoﬀ fee to ﬁnance greater advertising
levels, after controlling for observed and unobserved factors that explain individual
preferences for the program.
We estimate the model using full-information maximum likelihood, which results
in consistent estimates for all parameters. We conduct three pretests to evaluate
potential parameter fragility and model misspeciﬁcation. First, we replace the “ap-
proval” model with a model that uses voting preferences as the dependent variables in
equation (16). Second, we estimate a model that replaces the categorical variable on
ﬁrm size with the SZ1-SZ6 dummy variables used in our preliminary analysis. Third,
we censor the sample to remove 545 out of 5077 respondents who admitted to not
being informed on the activities of the Beef Checkoﬀ Program. Our results in each
case are robust.
18Table 3 presents our estimates of model coeﬃcients with robust standard errors. A
chi-square test of the model relative to a null model with all parameters restricted to
zero rejects the null (χ2 =9 4 .58). A chi-squared test of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ,
which represents a speciﬁcation test of the bivariate ordered probit structure, rejects
the hypothesis of no cross equation correlation of the errors.
With the exception of the binary variable for dairy operations in the approval
model, operation type is not a signiﬁcant predictor of approval or WTP for the
program. However, individual F-tests of the hypotheses that the operation type
binary variables are jointly equal to zero are statistically signiﬁcant in both equations
(approval: χ2 =6 8 .56; WTP: χ2 =1 2 .25).
Relative to the oldest producers (65+), the youngest producers in the sample
are more supportive of the checkoﬀ program and are also signiﬁcantly more likely
to support an increase in checkoﬀ-funded advertising levels. This ﬁnding suggests a
potential investment component for generic advertising in raising consumer demand
for beef in the long run.
The binary terms reﬂecting secondary operations are insigniﬁcant in the approval
model, as is the F-test of their joint signiﬁcance (approval: χ2 =1 .56). In the WTP
model, growers without a secondary operation are less likely to support expansion
of the checkoﬀ program and the joint F-test for both binary terms is marginally
signiﬁcant (approval: χ2 =5 .36)
Notably, after controlling for age, gender, and operational diﬀerences among pro-
ducers, we ﬁnd that larger operators are signiﬁcantly more likely to support greater
levels of generic advertising. In the WTP model, producers stated their preference
for one of three categorical choices over the extent of the generic advertising program:
to reduce the $1 per head checkoﬀ fee, to maintain the fee at the existing level, or to
increase the checkoﬀ fee. Our results indicate that an increase in operation size results
in a rightward shift in the probability density over the choice regions. The bottom
rows of Table 3 present the results of a 10% increase in ﬁrm size are on the probabil-
ity distribution. The location of the cut points (cut21=-1.041 and cut22=1.633) in
19the error structure of the WTP equation deﬁne the boundaries from which we mea-
sure changes in probabilities in response to the adjustment in ﬁrm size (see Greene
and Hensher, 2008; Sajaia, 2008). The large cut22 value is representative of the low
probability density associated with a preference for program expansion, as only 6.3
percent of respondents supported an increase in checkoﬀ fees above the current level.
Overall, a 10 percent increase in ﬁrm size of a typical producer results in a 0.58
percent increase in the probability of supporting an expansion of the Beef Checkoﬀ
Program and a 0.41 percent decrease in the probability of supporting a contraction.
The positive relationship between producer size and the preference for expanding the
generic advertising program suggests that advertising has reduced the dispersion of
consumers’ valuations in the beef market.
Generic beef advertising appears to have reduced the dispersion of consumers’
valuations for beef. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion advocated by Becker
and Murphy (1993) that the primary role of advertising is to increase the valuation of
marginal consumers. In the case of generic beef advertising, our results are in accord
with the views of Ozga (1960), Stigler (1961), Telser (1964) and Nelson (1970, 1974)
that advertising enhances performance in markets for advertised goods.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have examined the actions of individual market participants in re-
sponse to generic advertising programs in the Beef Checkoﬀ Program. We show that
large ﬁrms beneﬁt disproportionately from generic advertising programs when adver-
tising decreases the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, whereas small ﬁrms beneﬁt
disproportionately from generic advertising programs when advertising increases the
dispersion of consumers’ valuations. This observation provides a simple identiﬁcation
strategy for measuring advertising-induced changes in the market power of advertis-
ing ﬁrms by examining diﬀerences in the preferences of large and small operators in
generic advertising programs.
Our empirical goal is fundamentally descriptive in the sense that we do not pro-
20pose a “test” for a particular theory of the mechanism through which advertising
alters consumers’ valuations for advertised goods. Instead, our approach relies on
the revealed preferences of individual producers in a collective advertising program
to inform on changes in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations in the market.
We considered the preferences of beef producers towards expanding the generic
advertising program as revealed in recent USDA-Gallop data from the U.S. Beef
Checkoﬀ Program. We ﬁnd that the probability that a producer favors expanding
the generic advertising program is higher for large producers than for smaller pro-
ducers, an outcome consistent with an advertising-induced decrease in the dispersion
of consumers’ valuations and a commensurate increase in market performance. This
ﬁnding is echoed in the recent actions by producers in a number of commodity market-
ing orders who have legally challenged mandatory participation in generic advertising
programs on the grounds that generic messages are inconsistent with adopting niche
market positions. Niche market producers rely on advertising messages to raise the
valuations of consumers on the “high WTP” segment of market demand and would
beneﬁt accordingly from advertising messages that increase the dispersion of con-
sumers’ valuations. Our ﬁndings are consistent with this anecdotal evidence and in
accord with the views of Becker and Murphy (1993) that the primary role of adver-
tising is to raise the valuation of marginal consumers.
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24Table 1. Description of the data
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expand
a 1.9391 0.4276 1 3
Approve
b 3.8410 1.2360 1 5
Gen1(Male = 1) 0.9293 0.2563 0 1
Age1(< 40 yrs.) 0.0473 0.2123 0 1
Age2(40- 55 yrs.) 0.2919 0.4547 0 1
Age3 (55-65 yrs.) 0.2824 0.4501 0 1
Age4 (> 65 yrs.) 0.3785 0.4851 0 1
Op1 (cow/calf) 0.7094 0.4540 0 1
Op2 (dairy) 0.0912 0.2879 0 1
Op3 (farmer/feedlot) 0.0734 0.2611 0 1
Op4 (feedlot) 0.0234 0.1513 0 1
Op5 (livestock marketing) 0.0083 0.0905 0 1
Op6 (seedstock/purebread) 0.0399 0.1959 0 1
Op7 (stocker) 0.0433 0.2036 0 1
Op8 (all other) 0.0108 0.1035 0 1
Nso (no secondary op.=1) 0.6183 0.4859 0 1
Noco (secondary op. not cattle=1) 0.1564 0.3633 0 1
Size (category means)
c 0.1511 0.2377 0.01 1.5
.65in.5in
Notes:
aExpand: “In your opinion, should the $1-per-head Beef Checkoﬀ amount increase,
decrease or stay the same?”
bApprove: “Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the Beef Checkoﬀ program?”









25Table 2. Probit Analysis of Firm Size
























ﬁrm size 0.224∗∗∗ (2.92)


















Ho: ρ =0 χ2
(1) = 1365 p-value=0.00001
N 5077
Marginal eﬀect of 10% increase in ﬁrm size on willingness to pay
contract checkoﬀ program -0.41%
no change in checkoﬀ program size 0.013%
expand checkoﬀ program 0.58%
t statistics in parentheses
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01
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